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Cosmopolitanism, Identity and Recognition
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Abstract: An application of the social theory of Axel Honneth to global justice, arguing that development goals must include
provision for the intersubjective recognition required for identity formation. In the disciplines of Political Philosophy and
International Relations cosmopolitanism is often defined as the view that all people, no matter their national, ethnic or re-
ligious backgrounds and no matter what their gender, have an equal moral status. The most telling enunciation of this view
is the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, the focus that is given to rights and a global form
of legal equality by this document and by such theorists as John Rawls is not rich enough to capture all of the ethical demands
that global society places upon well-to-do Westerners and developed nations. This paper makes use of a thesis by Axel
Honneth to the effect that political thinking needs “a basic conceptual shift to the normative premises of a theory of recog-
nition that locates the core of all experiences of injustice in the withdrawal of social recognition, in the phenomena of hu-
miliation and disrespect.” Honneth identifies three spheres of recognition in modern societies: love, law, and achievement.
I offer some exposition of his theory and then argue that global justice must be understood to embrace the substantive eth-
ical values that arise in these three spheres as well as the procedural standards of moral rightness that belongs to the second
of them. Such an expanded conception of global justice will yield an enriched conception of cosmopolitanism.
Keywords: Cosmopolitanism, Identity, Recognition, Honneth, Global Justice, Development Ethics
Introduction
INTHIS PAPER I will argue that the cosmopol-itan ideal – defined as the view that all peopleare of equal moral standing – can be read more
broadly than the modern liberal insistence that
everyone has the same fundamental rights. 1 On the
liberal view of justice, an injustice is understood as
a violation of a right held by an individual person.
Whether the right be the right to life, to subsistence
or to property, any act which denies or takes away
such a right – killing someone, letting them starve,
or taking their land, for example – would be an act
of injustice. Such acts would be injustices not only
because they cause unjustifiable material harm to
their victims – by taking their life, radically dimin-
ishing their life prospects or taking away their liveli-
hood – but also because they are violations of the
rights those individuals possess as rights bearers.
This conception has been criticised as allowing little
room for the harms that come from the systematic
or occasional denigration that groups as such might
suffer, and gives but little regard to the vulnerabilities
of people that arise from the social – as opposed to
political and economic – relationships in which they
live their lives.2 Accordingly, if we could develop a
concept of injustice which is broader than that of a
violation of individual rights, we would have a
concept which could be understood not only in
modern liberal terms, but also, perhaps, in communit-
arian terms. If such a concept could indicate a bond
between people richer than the reciprocal negative
duty of not violating the rights of individuals but
rather a bondmarked by solidarity,3 then this concept
would suggest a new conception of cosmopolitanism:
no longer one of every individual having equal
moral status, but of all individuals constituting a
global community.
In order to provide a way into the problematic
described above I will explore a thesis from the work
of a German philosopher associated with the Frank-
furt School of Critical Social Theory, Axel Honneth.
Honneth has argued that political thinking needs “a
basic conceptual shift to the normative premises of
a theory of recognition that locates the core of all
experiences of injustice in the withdrawal of social
recognition, in the phenomena of humiliation and
disrespect.”4 I will explicate this thesis and show
how it can provide the richer concept of cosmopolit-
anism which I have indicated.
1Nancy Fraser andAxel Honneth,Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, translated by Joel Golb, James Ingram,
and Christiane Wilke, London: Verso, 2003, 134.
2 Nancy Fraser, “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation”, in Nancy Fraser and Axel
Honneth, op.cit., 7-109.
3 Jürgen Habermas, “Justice and Solidarity: On the Discussion Concerning Stage 6,” in TheMoral Domain: Essays in the Ongoing Discussion
between Philosophy and the Social Sciences, Thomas E. Wren (ed.) Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 1990, 224-51.
4 Axel Honneth, “Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser”, in Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, op.cit., 110-197, 134.
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IThe theoretical basis for Honneth’s thesis derives
from such varied sources as the political philosophy
of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) and
the social psychology of George Herbert Mead
(1863-1931). Hegel had argued that a person’s
identity is formed in the context of the recognition
that others – initially parents – give to that person,
and Mead’s development psychology bears this out.
Social psychology is rich with descriptions of how
the identity of individuals is shaped by their upbring-
ing and their social environments.5 According to
Honneth, the form of recognition that sustains us and
grounds our development as children is that of love.
From the point of view of the parent, what it is about
the growing child that this love responds to is its
need. Because the object of this relation of recogni-
tion is needful and the one who accords the recogni-
tion is the one who loves, the relationship of love is
between the needs of one and the love of the other.
So, for Honneth, love is a recognition of need which
sustains the growth and development of the needy.
The institutional or social framework in which this
first level of recognition is manifest is that of the
family or of whatever surrogate for the family the
society provides. The benefit that flows to the child
who is loved is not only physical sustenance but the
kind of emotional support that allows it to grow in
self-confidence. This in turn supports the sense of
individual identity that emerges within a loving
family and enlarges it as the child enters its support-
ive community. As Honneth puts it,
This fundamental level of emotional confidence
– not only in the experience of needs and feel-
ings, but also in their expression – which the
intersubjective experience of love helps to bring
about, constitutes the psychological precondi-
tion for the development of all further attitudes
of self-respect.6
It is significant for my argument that the processes
being described here are processes both of individu-
ation and of insertion into a community.
Love is an affect. It is an emotion and in most
cases – especially as it relates to parenting – it is
given unconditionally, unilaterally, and disinter-
estedly. The principle of reciprocity, so central to
liberal thought, does not apply to love. A parent does
not love her child provided the child loves her back
or in order to gain an advantage for herself. As an
emotion there is a degree of passivity to it in that it
is elicited in the one who loves by the object of that
love. It is seldom planned for or parcelled out in ra-
tionally delineated measures. In order to apply his
concept more widely than the family, Honneth also
highlights the concept of ‘care’ and argues that even
outside of the context of family relations there is a
form of affective and practical recognition of the
other in which the one who cares acknowledges the
needs of the other and is moved by such emotions
as compassion and solicitude to meet those needs in
whatever way the situation might call for.
For Honneth one of the ways of distinguishing the
sphere of love and caring from other moral spheres
is by identifying the specific forms that injustice or
the failure to meet the demands of this sphere might
take. If the appropriate kind of recognition of a per-
son at this level is to love that person or to care for
them as the situation requires, the harm of not being
accorded the appropriate recognition at the level of
caring relationships between people is the harm of
not being loved or cared for when one needs to be.
This will take different forms in different contexts.
For a very young child, being unloved and neglected
can be literally fatal, but even in less dramatic cases
it can leave psychological scars that last a lifetime.
Feeling that one is not lovable or ‘dirty’ or ‘cheap’,
being unable to trust others or open out to them, or
harbouring inchoate feelings of anger at rejection
are all harms that can come from not being recog-
nised at this level.7 The kinds of actions that evince
a failure to accord recognition at this level range
from parental neglect and bureaucratic heartlessness
to torture and rape. If torture and rape seem concep-
tually far removed from parental neglect, the link
that Honneth draws between them is that they both
produce or exacerbate physical helplessness in their
victims. The neglected child is helpless and is there-
fore unable to develop the kind of self-confidence
that comes from being looked after physically and
loved emotionally. Such a child is not able to see it-
self as valued or as being in possession of its own
person in the world. The victim of torture or rape is
made to feel that they have no control over their
bodies.8 They suffer the ultimate humiliation of los-
ing their bodily integrity and sense of self-control.
This is a dire threat to that basic self-confidence that
comes from being in possession of one’s own phys-
ical being. Despite the many differences between
these two kinds of injustice, therefore, they are both
failures to recognise the basic bodily needs of the
5 Rom Harré, Social Being: A Theory for Social Psychology, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979. Rom Harré, Personal Being: A Theory for
Individual Psychology, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983.
6Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, translated by Joel Anderson, Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1995, 107.
7 Axel Honneth, “Between Aristotle and Kant: Recognition and Moral Obligation” in his Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Crit-
ical Theory, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007, 129-143, 136.
8 Elaine Scarry, The body in pain: the making and unmaking of the world, New York: Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987.
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victim: needs that would be met by love or by caring.
As Honneth puts it, “The forms of practical maltreat-
ment in which a person is forcibly deprived of any
opportunity freely to dispose over his or her own
body represent the most fundamental sort of personal
degradation.”9
Honneth’s thesis is that such actions result in in-
justice which consists in more than the material and
physical harms that they inevitably cause. Rather, it
is the injustice of personal degradation and of an at-
tack upon the psychological bases of one’s self-
confidence. It is the injustice of not being recognised
as worthy of love and care. Moreover, this form of
injustice has no culturally specific elements and is
therefore universal. The damage to the sense of self,
self-control and bodily integrity caused by it does
not depend on culturally specific constructions of
the self or of the self’s autonomy.
II
Honneth also draws from Hegel an account of a
second level of social interaction marked by a new
form of mutual recognition. This is the sphere of
Law. The concept of law that is intended here makes
connections between the moral law and civil law.
The central idea is that any individual has a legal or
moral status which is equal to that of any other indi-
vidual in a given legal/moral framework. The prin-
ciples of equality before the law and of impartiality
in moral thinking are central to this outlook. This
form of recognition arises from the faculty of reason
more than from the emotions of love or care. From
the perspective opened up in this new relational
sphere of moral recognition, everyone is equal. The
object of the relation of recognition at this level is
the moral individual as a bearer of rights, and the
one who accords the recognition is the moral agent
who does what is right. The institutional or social
framework within which this level of recognition is
articulated is that of law. The sphere of modern law
is one of equality of legal standing. It was when
legal rights were uncoupled from any traditionally
based status – whether inherited or purchased – that
they became truly equal. This required a legal system
with no exceptions or privileges not open to anyone
under the jurisdiction of that system.
Honneth argues that this recognition of the rights
of others has been driven, not by the imperatives that
derive from pure reason as Kant had supposed, but
by historical struggles in the West. These struggles
have gone through three stages. First, in the period
leading up to and including the eighteenth century
there was the struggle for the civil rights of freedom
against the inherited privileges and dispensations of
the estates into which people were said to have been
born. Second, coming to a head in the nineteenth
century, there were struggles over rights of political
participation such as the fight to extend suffrage.
Third, highlighted in the twentieth century, there
were struggles for social rights such as education
and welfare. In each case, the impetus came from
seeing that the rights being struggled for were neces-
sary to secure the rights alreadywon. So, for example
education and welfare were seen as prerequisites for
political participation, and political participation, in
turn, was seen as necessary to secure and defend the
civil rights that had been won in earlier struggles.
What such struggles seek to achieve is that everyone
in a given society recognises everyone else in that
society as equally capable of making free and
autonomous decisions in accordance with the moral
ideas prevalent in that society. What is developed
here is the sphere of liberty within which all persons
can choose their own lives.
But this is not a sphere in which an individual is
set free from the need for recognition from others.
It is because people acknowledge one another as
moral subjects capable of moral choices that they
both accede to others the right to make such decisions
and expect from them a reciprocal recognition of
their own right to make them. “In obeying the law,
legal subjects recognize each other as persons cap-
able of autonomously making reasonable decisions
about moral norms.”10 To recognise a person in that
way is to respect them, and knowing oneself to be
recognised as a person “capable of autonomously
making reasonable decisions about moral norms”
gives rise to an attitude of self-respect.
Notice that there is more at issue here than a purely
legalistic or procedural affirmation of equality. Inso-
far as such an affirmation is based upon an attitude
of respect for the capacity of each individual to make
responsible decisions for themselves, there is also
an affirmation of a conception of what constitutes a
good human life. Such a life is one marked by the
ability to make responsible decisions and by the re-
cognition of that capacity on the part of others in a
given community. Not only do we have here a recon-
ciliation between the liberal ideal of autonomy and
the communitarian ideal of mutuality, but also a re-
conciliation between a minimalist and procedural
conception of justice and a more substantive concep-
tion alluding to an ideal of human goodness. It is on
the basis of this ideal that both the mutual social re-
cognition of respect and the individual’s capacity for
self-respect are based.
9 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, translated by Joel Anderson, Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1995, 132.
10 Ibid, 110.
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Accordingly, the harm that people suffer who are
not recognised at this level is the undermining of
their sense of self-respect. It is a challenge to their
sense of themselves as an autonomous agent and as
a bearer of rights. There is an appreciable difference
between the feeling that no one cares about one and
the feeling that one has been taken advantage of. The
crimes that can give rise to the latter feeling include
deception, fraud, robbery, exploitation, enslavement
and oppression. Once again, Honneth’s thesis is that,
along with the material deprivations or injuries that
might arise from such crimes, there is the injustice
of not being recognised in the appropriate manner.
To sum up:
Just as, in the case of love, children acquire, via
the continuous experience of ‘maternal’ care,
the basic self-confidence to assert their needs
in an unforced manner, adult subjects acquire,
via the experience of legal recognition, the
possibility of seeing their actions as the univer-
sally respected expression of their own
autonomy.11
III
The third sphere of recognition that Honneth identi-
fies is that of achievement. Everyone seeks to earn
the respect and admiration of others through the
things that they do and the kind of person that they
are. When others accord them such respect and ad-
miration they are recognising those achievements.
This in turn provides encouragement and validation
for the talents and achievements that that person has
displayed. Societies depend for their progress and
development upon the initiative and creativity of
their members. In order to provide incentives for in-
dividuals to contribute their talents to the community,
they must be accorded recognition in the form of
praise, reward or acknowledgement. This recognition
may take the form of monetary rewards, promotion,
or other forms of social preferment. However, while
suchmaterial rewards may be the concrete signifiers
of the recognition, it is the recognition itself which
is of greatest moment. Such social psychologists as
AbrahamMaslow have highlighted this need in us.12
The desire for status and for the recognition of one’s
achievements can be said to be ineliminable from
human motivations and thus from human society. In
contrast to the legal sphere in which everyone has
equal status, this sphere is marked by stratification,
hierarchy and even elitism. However, it remains a
normative sphere in that there is a requirement that
recognition, praise and other rewards should be ac-
corded to all and only those who deserve them.
In traditional societies social status and esteem
were tied to one’s position in society in a way that
was relatively independent of one’s own personal
achievements. If one was born into the nobility or if
one joined the priesthood one was accorded social
standing just by virtue of the position that one held.
This was an ethos centred on honour rather than
achievement. It depended upon amonolithic concep-
tion of which social achievements were worthwhile
and this, in turn, is tied to a strong sense of attach-
ment to community values on the part of members
of the social group.Where group identity is dominant
and honour sought, recognition of the achievements
of group members would produce group pride and
the mutual recognition of such achievements would
produce a strong sense of community solidarity. It
might be suggested that examples of such an ethos
survive in modern societies in the form of allegiance
to sporting clubs and also in the form of nationalism.
In such contexts, individuals can feel self-esteem
and pride to the extent that they identify with the
achievements of the groups of which they see them-
selves as members.
In modern capitalist societies, in contrast, given
a starting point of equal legal status and the social
provision of a level playing field, esteem will be le-
gitimately awarded on the basis of achievement and
of one’s contribution to the common goals of the
community. However, while modern capitalist cul-
ture accords esteem only to what is deemed to be a
useful social achievement, there is no consensus as
to what is to count as such achievement. Is the work
of women in the home to be the basis of social es-
teem? Is entrepreneurial success such a basis? How
will we measure sporting prowess against heroism
in military enterprises? And which groups within
society value some of these achievements and not
others? For social esteem to be based on achieve-
ments, there must be a consensus on what achieve-
ments are to matter. But in the context of modern
value-pluralism one cannot count on the recognition
of one’s achievements on the part of others. Prestige
arises from one’s contribution to publicly acknow-
ledged goods but one might have to struggle to have
the goods that one is striving for accepted as publicly
valuable. For example, in a capitalist society where
money is the measure of value, wealth is taken to be
an indicator of worthwhile contributions. Accord-
ingly, rightly or wrongly, the wealthy are admired
by some irrespective of their actual achievements,
while even successful artists are relatively devalued.
Given the uncertainties that attend social prestige,
what is sought in modern societies is more individu-
alised and takes the form of self-respect. In this
context solidarity has less to do with group identific-
11 Ibid, 118.
12 Abraham Maslow, Toward a psychology of being, 3rd edition, New York: J. Wiley & Sons, 1998.
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ation and more to do with symmetrical relations of
respect. If these relations cannot be based on a shared
conception of what achievements are valuable in a
situation of value pluralism, then they must reduce
to the minimal standard of not being denigrated.
Solidarity then consists in not being devalued on the
basis of one’s difference. That is, it would consist
merely in tolerance. Although recognition at this
third level of status and esteem becomes fractured
in modern pluralist societies, it can have an all-em-
bracing scope in the negative form of tolerance for
practices, achievements and values that do not offend
against the requirements of recognition of the rights
of others at the level of law.
The object of the relation of recognition at this
third level is the social individual as a possessor of
talents and abilities, and the one who accords the
recognition is the individual or group which creates
and sustains the prestige or honour which that indi-
vidual is given. In this way the institutional or social
frameworks through which this level of recognition
is realised will include the relatively formal system
of rewards given through wages and other forms of
remuneration, and the relatively informal systems of
differentiation of status and of social esteem which
individuals or groups can achieve within a modern
society.
The harm suffered by those who are not given the
recognition that is their due at this level is a loss of
their sense of self-worth. One will feel oneself as
insignificant within the community and as having
little or reduced worth in the eyes of others. This in
turn will undermine one’s assurance that one has any
worth. Once again, just how this will be different
from the loss of self-confidence that comes from not
being loved or the loss of a sense of dignity that
comes from being exploited might be more difficult
to articulate than Honneth allows, but his key point
is that there is a form of injustice which consists in
suffering this kind of psychological harm. The kinds
of crimes that can give rise to this feeling, and which
are thus offences against the demand that a com-
munity should accord recognition to achievement,
include discourtesy, sexism, racism, the cult of
celebrity, discrimination and stigmatization.
IV
The three spheres that Honneth has described, when
taken together, constitute the scope of justice. There
are not three kinds of justice. In each sphere justice
consists in being recognised. Justice consists in ob-
taining what one needs in the context of love and
care, being accorded equal treatment before the law,
and being given social status in ways that one de-
serves. In each case, justice consists in being accor-
ded the appropriate kind of recognition.
How the three spheres of recognition interact can
be seen when we consider the notion of distributive
justice. The social rewards just alluded to will largely
take material forms, thereby linking the sphere of
recognition of achievement to the issue of distributive
justice. All other considerations aside, a distribution
of material and social rewards will be just insofar as
it is deserved by the contribution the recipient has
been able to make to society through their talents
and achievements. However, just what material and
social rewards are deserved will be open to consider-
able contestation. Wages, salaries and executive pay
packages are matters for constant negotiation and
debate. Such debates are the sharp end of deeper
debates about the nature and bases of distributive
justice in modern societies. Overshadowing such
debates, and standing as a constant horizon to them,
is the legal/moral order in which everyone is deemed
morally equal to everyone else. This framework
provides a constant pressure towards egalitarianism
in social and political struggles over distributive
justice. Insofar as everyone is morally entitled to an
equal opportunity to enter the competition for recog-
nition based on achievement, so a minimum provi-
sion of social goods must be made in order to allow
for a level playing field. Any stratification that results
from differentiation in talents and achievements
beyond this base level is deserved and therefore just.
But any differentiation or stratification that prevents
an individual from having a fair opportunity to
achievewould offend against the egalitarian principle
of equal moral status and equality before the law and
would therefore be unjust.
But there is a further horizon to these debates:
namely, the level of recognition based on love. In an
essay on Habermas, Honneth argues for the liberal
principle that everyone in a given society should be
enabled to participate in the public sphere of unco-
erced discourse so as to secure their role in political
will-formation and have their voice heard in debates
over the distribution of social goods. However, every
society contains people who by reason of age or
disability are not able to be included in such dis-
course with equal effective standing. Even if the
principle of equality gives them standing within the
public sphere of social discourse, their differentiated
abilities preclude their participation. Such people
should receive care. In some cases the care they re-
ceive will enable them to enter the public sphere but
in other cases their situation will be such that such
an outcome can never be achieved. Justice demands
continuing care in the latter case. For the former
group – which includes both the young and the tem-
porarily infirm – as soon as they are able to enter the
communicative context and have their voices heard,
they enter the sphere of justice as equals. Caring thus
has a necessary but limited role to play in securing
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social justice. It is necessary because of the liberal
ideal that everyone should be able to participate
politically and that anyone who cannot participate
equally is owed assistance in order to help them do
so. But anyone who can participate is not an appro-
priate object of caring. Caring is only appropriate as
a unilateral giving of assistance and would be de-
meaning for anyone who did not need such assist-
ance. As Honneth puts it:
The moment the other person is recognized as
an equal being among all others – in that he or
she is capable of participating in practical dis-
courses – the unilateral relation of care must
come to an end, for an attitude of benevolence
is not permissible toward subjects who are able
to articulate their beliefs and views publicly.13
Honneth argues that the struggle for recognition is
foundational and motivational for all other political
struggles. Even if the announced objective of a social
movement is fair distribution of social goods, what
motivates the struggle is not merely an economic
interest in redistribution but the sense of insult that
accompanies the unfair system of distribution which
is being opposed. I am reminded of the peasants in
the barrios of Caracas under the rule of President
Hugo Chavez in Venezuela who were interviewed
in John Pilger’s film: The War on Democracy.14
They appreciated the better economic deal they were
getting under the new regime, but they were most
impressed by the recognition they were accorded
through local community democracies and education-
al opportunities. Previously their barrios had not even
appeared on the city maps of Caracas, but now they
were being helped to educate themselves and to take
charge of their own communities. Another example
occurred inMemphis, Tennessee in 1968whenAfro-
American striking garbage workers carried placards
that did not convey economic demands but simply
stated, “I am a man”.
Honneth concludes that the struggle for recogni-
tion is basic and that identity politics and class con-
flict both get their impetus, and also their legitimacy,
from this struggle. They get their impetus because
the perceived refusal of recognition gives rise to an-
ger, humiliation and resentment. But we need to be
able to decide which claims for justice are legitimate
through seeing what the motivational bases for them
are. If it is not to be such morally inappropriate bases
as anger, greed and envy, or the forms of resentment
described by Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Scheler,
we need to posit the ethically legitimate, necessary
conditions for identity formation and social inclusion.
Recognition is such a condition. Recognition is a
substantial good because it is a prerequisite for psy-
chological maturity, legal equality and social inclu-
sion. These are substantial goods rather than proced-
ural rights. In order to achieve autonomy as an indi-
vidual, and in order to achieve admission into the
community, an individual must be accepted into a
system of recognition which operates at the three
levels of love, law and esteem. Individualist and
communitarian goals are combined here to form a
motivational basis for social struggle and a rationale
for the legitimacy of such struggle. As Honneth puts
it:
What motivates individuals or social groups to
call the prevailing social order into question
and to engage in practical resistance is the
moral conviction that, with respect to their own
situations or particularities, the recognition
principles considered legitimate are incorrectly
or inadequately applied.15
Recognition theory combines procedural concepts
of the right with substantive conceptions of the good:
namely the individuation of people and their inclu-
sion into society. This constitutes what Honneth calls
a “teleological liberalism”16 in which the values of
individual freedom are combined with substantive
goals of human psychological and social develop-
ment. These values of individuation and social inclu-
sion admit of both principles of equality and of dif-
ferentiation of esteem. The three levels of recognition
do not all reduce to equality, and love and esteem
are not spheres of justice in which egalitarian recog-
nition principles are appropriate.
As the phrase, “teleological liberalism”, might
suggest, the structure of Honneth’s argument is Aris-
totelian. The value and normativity of recognition –
the fact that a refusal of recognition is an injustice
rather than just a misfortune – arise from recogni-
tion’s being a necessary condition for both individu-
ation and social inclusion. Insofar as individuation
and social inclusion are both necessary for a happy
and fulfilled human life – a life marked by what Ar-
istotle would call eudaimonia – so they are ethical
goods, and any social action or circumstance that is
necessary for their attainment becomes normative.
To accord recognition in the spheres of love, law and
esteem is an ethical demand, a moral duty and a re-
13 Axel Honneth, “The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of Postmodernism” in his, Disrespect: The Normative
Foundations of Critical Theory, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007, 99-128, 124.
14 Details at http://www.johnpilger.com/
15 Axel Honneth, “Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser” in Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, op.cit., 110-197,
157.
16 Ibid, 178.
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quirement of justice. Everyone has a right to such
recognition.
Conclusion
It follows from this argument that cosmopolitanism
should not be thought of simply as espousing equal
moral status before international law for all citizens
of the world. It needs to be thought of in more sub-
stantive terms. By including the three levels of recog-
nition that Honneth has identified, we can understand
cosmopolitanism as the view that everyone in the
world has a legitimate claim and expectation that
they will be recognised as the three levels that Hon-
neth has described: the levels of love, law and
achievement. The more usual understanding of cos-
mopolitanism focuses almost exclusively on the
second level. My richer understanding embraces the
first and third as well.What such a richer conception
of cosmopolitanism will bring to the discourse of
global ethics is a widening of scope and a deeper
understanding of what justice requires. It is arguable
that the values of love, equality and achievement are
of greater universal relevance than a discourse
centred on rights in that they are the prerequisites
for the solidarity that marks communities the world
over. Moreover, this wider form of cosmopolitanism
allows us to urge that a fuller range of human needs
and capabilities be included in economic develop-
ment goals and made the object of the care and
political struggles of the world’s peoples. Further,
by acknowledging the social and communitarian
contexts in which people develop self-confidence,
self-respect and self-esteem, and by noting the shared
values which constitute such contexts, we can come
closer to seeing the world as a community of peoples
constituting a public discursive sphere rather than as
an arena for individualist struggles over rights.
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